UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----X Docket#

GRACIE BAKED LLC et al., : 22-cv-04019-RPK-VMS

Plaintiffs, :

: U.S. Courthouse: Brooklyn, New York - versus -

GIFTROCKET, INC.,

: December 4, 2024

Defendant : 5:06 p.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR STATUS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE VERA M. SCANLON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

E A R A N C E S: P P (VIA VIDEO/AUDIO)

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(Appearances continue on next page)

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3 Proceedings 1 THE COURT: All right. This case is Gracie 2 Baked LLC v. GiftRocket 22-cv-4019. 3 So let's start with plaintiff's counsel. MR. JANOVE: Good evening. Raphael Janove and 4 5 Liana Vitale of Janove PLLC for plaintiffs. 6 THE COURT: All right. And how about 7 GiftRocket defendants? 8 MS. KRAMER: Good evening, your Honor. This is Katherine Kramer of DTO Law, and I'm joined by my 9 10 colleagues Megan O' Neill and Kevin Westerman. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Just going down the docket 12 here. All right. How about for Sunrise? MR. RASHID: Good evening, your Honor. This is 13 14 Faris Rashid from Greene Espel. I'm joined by my 15 colleagues Gina Tonn and Kshithij Shrinath. 16 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So we have a 17 stack of papers from you all. I have some questions. 18 The one I have the most questions about, which we'll get 19 to in a minute, the request for the text messages for 20 which plaintiffs are claiming that there was a waiver of 21 the attorney-client privilege and obviously the 22 defendants are taking a different view. 23 But let's start with something maybe a little 24 bit easier, although this is out of order. So there's 25 document 205 which was filed on November 1st, and this is

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a request for the running of additional search terms. The plaintiff is moving for GiftRocket to do this and one question I have which is flagged on the docket was what is the burden to GiftRocket at this point. At least in the letter on page 3 what plaintiff had said was plaintiffs proposed that the above terms -- and I don't even know how to pronounce these. Anyway, however you would say it, the ones that are identified on the first page of the letter, the above terms were run on custodial documents dated between July 1, 2022 and June 3, 2024 to minimize the chance that terms hit on other earlier corporate reorganizations of the GiftRocket defendants to substantially reduce any potential burden. Later on in the letter there was also a suggestion of a way to avoid getting privileged documents by noting who the recipients were. But anyway, for GiftRocket side, what do you know about how big a search this is, how long it would take et cetera, et cetera? What's the burden? MR. WESTERMAN: Good evening, your Honor. This

is Kevin Westerman of DTO. I have an answer to your question on just the size of the review universe and also a proposed compromise that can hopefully take this motion off the docket.

So the review universe if we were to limit it

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to July 2022 through June 2024, as the plaintiff proposed, would bring it down to about 100,000 pages which is still quite a bit to get through and would impose an undue burden.

But in order to move things along, we would propose the plaintiff's motion also mentions that they are interested and want internal discussions between and among GiftRocket employees --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WESTERMAN: -- that discuss the restructuring. So if we were to limit the review universe to that time period and also limit it to instances where it's internal communications, so just people with GiftRocket or Tremendous domain addresses are on the to and from line, we believe that that will bring that 100,000 page universe down to about 50,00 or maybe slightly less pages.

And so while we still believe any additional further review would be disproportionate to the needs here, we kind of get the sense of where the Court might be going with this based on the order and wanted to propose that at the outset.

THE COURT: Okay. From plaintiff's side, have you considered the proposal?

MR. JANOVE: Just hearing the proposal for the

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first time, I think well, that works for us.

THE COURT: Okay. So to put some bracketing timelines on it on the defendant's side, what do you think it would take for you to run the search, do the review, provide it over to the plaintiff?

MR. WESTERMAN: I would say 30 days would typically be fine and then we're also running into the holidays. So possibly ask for a couple of extra days.

I'm looking, pulling out my calendar now. I think June
6. Not June 6. January 6th would be manageable if that works for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: I was just going to say it's okay because I assume that everybody would be reluctant to give consent until you know if you're going to get a little more time which, you know, I won't hide the ball (indiscernible) a little more time.

All right. So I'm going to take the 205 motion as moot because you've come to a resolution as discussed on the call today and the production by the defendants will be made by January 26, 2025. All right. That's that one. I'm just looking through my folders here.

All right. The one that I have the most questions about or at least not sure where this should go is 203 which is the motion related to the text messages between Mr. (indiscernible) and Bentley and there's the

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assertion of privilege.

So look, couple of questions. I might have more questions, but I'm going to tell you what they are. I think, unless we get clarification here, I think I want some additional submission but among, and not in any particular order, my questions are first, it seems like from at least the defendant's perspective, this exchange was done with the advice of counsel that the privilege was being maintained. So the question right out of the box is is that a waiver such that -- I understand the defendant's position is no, there was no -- you know, the privilege is still in place.

But assume that the privilege did not exist but counsel thought it did exist between the two, both the counsel in this case, and the Giftly counsel thought it did and the parties, according to the information here, had their conversations with that understanding. Is that a waiver to the extent that the privilege was there and even if it wasn't, did they have any intention of waiving it such that -- I mean I think under those circumstances where they understood it was okay, this is almost like the cases where someone accidentally emails something and they don't mean to let it go. They did what they could to protect it and when there's a problem they re-call it, and that's not a waiver. So that's one question.

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I guess on the defendant's side I would like to get to the more traditional approach to this. What exactly do you think the comment interest is here responding to the plaintiff's description of, you know, what the interrelationship here is.

And then the third point, and this is more of a -- I'm trying to think of the incentive and reasoning behind the privilege. Honestly, what I find sort of troubling/problematic here is plaintiff's claim is that these communications between the two senior officers of these two companies, the two CEOs, was not privileged because they are not in the same lawsuit together.

But what seems difficult to reconcile is that plaintiff had two of the same parties in the lawsuit at the same time. Plaintiff had the same counsel. Plaintiffs know about both the GiftRocket and the Giftly case. And you know, presumably, there's nothing in the record to suggest otherwise, the plaintiffs didn't split themselves and say we're never going to think about the other case.

So effectively, plaintiff created the situation where plaintiff could easily share information about the cases and in fact, you know, you put out a press release talking about the fact that you were counsel in both cases. Again, you have the same parties and it seems

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like it's a free-for-all, you could do whatever you want with regard to the information that is being provided in both of the cases.

Now, Giftly settled it seems like early early, so this didn't go on for that long. But it was certainly envisioned that, you know, you'd be wearing both hats and the same parties would be getting information from both sides. So it seems -- now I'm not exactly sure what theory to apply but I'm not quite sure this is reasonable or fair or the right understanding where there's free flowing information on the plaintiff's side but not on defendant's side when they are the other parties on the other side, just you happened to file it as two separate lawsuits. I don't know, conceivably this could have been one lawsuit it seems from the description. And I don't know that much about Giftly, but it seems from your description that this is a kind of a mirror or copycat, however you want to describe it, very, very similar and enough that you could describe it in the press release as being, you know, the defense is consumer interest in this area.

So I'm troubled by the fact that plaintiffs are, according to plaintiffs, you -- (indiscernible) not talking about it but it seems like from what you're saying you're freely able to exchange information because

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it's the same parties and the same lawyers. And yet somehow the defendants, who are the defendants in their respective lawsuits with you who joined together in your press release are not supposed to be talking and, you know, they're waiving their privilege. So I'm not sure how that fits in the paradigm but it's troubling.

And then I'm going to get back around the -- if you have this information now, great. But this is part of what I'd like to see in some additional submissions is accepting plaintiff's description of what was going on here, many of the cases have some connection to a particular transaction or set of transactions between the parties that are claiming the common interest privilege, the common defense. So taking the one case I was talking about, the various alleged infringers, right, they were all in the chain of distribution.

So I'm curious if you know about cases where you don't have that contractual relationship between the two parties that are claiming the joint privilege other than obviously there was a historical contractual relationship about having the same lawyers do some work for both parties. But, you know, that seems a bit old.

Anyway, so this is sort of musings on this issue. So let me hear from defendants. Any reaction?

Or you can think about it and give me a supplemental

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1 submission and I'll hear from plaintiff and the same 2 thing.

MS. O'NEILL: Thank you, your Honor. This is Megan O'Neill on behalf of the GiftRocket defendants.

Well, I'd like to go to the second and the third areas that you highlighted which is what is the common interest because our view is that the analysis does not need to go further than that under Second Circuit law.

So here, the plaintiffs seem to be challenging, and this seems to be the crux of the dispute, whether there is a common interest or not. And from our perspective, it couldn't be more obvious that there is a common interest. Most of the cases have to do with a non-litigation posture as your Honor referenced. And so perhaps there were writings in those cases, but here the law is pretty clear you don't need a writing that actually formalizes the agreement.

I personally have been part of many common interest agreements as a class action defense lawyer and it's not uncommon to have copycat suits filed by the same plaintiff's counsel against several different defendants. And it's very important to be able to share strategies in those cases and not have it be a waiver of privilege. And the common interest doctrine has always been the one

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1 that all the defense counsel rely on in my experience.

2 | So the common interest here being not just a similar suit

3 but nearly a copy and pasted lawsuit against two

4 different, you know, like a business model itself being

identical.

The plaintiffs have pointed to, you know, some small differences in terms of the websites. But the theory of liability, the claims, the plaintiffs, all of it were the same.

So here the common interest was -- you know, I don't know what more in a submission we could actually give the Court without waiving the privilege and that was plaintiffs had pointed to -- they've claimed that my declaration was inadequate but I can't say more without waiving privilege. I can't say what I talked to Davis Wright and Tremain about other than to say that everything was in furtherance of a common interest and that we agreed there was a common interest and that the privilege applied.

And so, you know, this is the tricky part about privilege is there's not a lot you can say about why the privilege applies other than the parameters and boundaries which is what we're trying to do here.

But I don't really understand honestly why the plaintiffs are seeking that. It just seems aside from

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just morbid curiosity what the CEO of each of the defendants were saying to one another, how during the litigation, not sort of ten years earlier, in terms of that there was some allegation of conspiracy, which there isn't, but actually what their comments were about how they were going to defend the lawsuit, to me the relevance of that, it's only relevant if they're talking about the legal strategy which shows that if they're talking about the legal strategy, they are engaged in a common interest conversation. If they weren't, we wouldn't be alleging privilege over it, and we did produce lots of text messages that didn't have to do with that. So we limited the scope so that we were very circumspect. So if it's another conversation, the plaintiffs would already have it.

And so I'm a little bit at a loss because to me the common interest seems so clear. We are both, as your Honor pointed out, like the same counsel is suing us in the same — with exactly the same words. And so what responses we are going to do is coordinated in many cases. Lawyers talk to each other. Just speaking hypothetically, lawyers speak in the defense of class actions all the time about what strategies to best use and how we think the courts will perceive them and how one judge's reaction could affect another judge's

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reaction. And all of that is done under the umbrella of privilege under the common interest doctrine.

So I think that that's the -- from our perspective, while all of these -- I do appreciate that your Honor is raising a lot of important concerns and fairness considerations, but from our perspective under Second Circuit law, the common interest doctrine very clearly protects these conversations.

THE COURT: Okay. So maybe what you just repeated in your letter, and I am not seeing what it is that you're saying is the common interest. Okay?

Because it's what you're saying very generally. Most businesses have an interest in defeating the plaintiff's consumer-related class actions. I mean that would be a true statement and then get down more specifically to, you know, financials, monetary transfer businesses, you know, kind of including Tremendous and GiftRocket, right?

Yes, sure, it's generally the theme. But you can't be talking all the time because if you're talking all the time, you have an antitrust problem. It's just not happening because you're competitors, right?

Supposedly like two of the bigger competitors in this sphere. So sure, lawyers can talk generally. You could go to, you know, in-house counsel conferences, you could go to class action defense conferences and talk.

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But here what supposedly is happening, you know, and obviously everyone has a suspicious mind until they actually see the text, but the information being exchanged between two parties not in the same lawsuit who are competitors but they can be with each other but they're also presumably unhappy about the fact that they have been sued and want to both defeat plaintiff's claims in and of themselves in this case and also I would assume hopefully define in a helpful way the law as it affects your business.

Yes, that's generally true but common interest suggest something more specific. And the cases that you're both citing are much tighter relationships between the parties who are sharing the information. So again, I think the one that's helpful is the one that was cited with regard to infringement because it wasn't that the parties were identical, you know, more akin to the joint tort (indiscernible) or something like that. They were in the chain. They may have had different activities in which they engaged in with regard to the distribution of the allegedly infringing material. But they still were responding to the same or similar set of facts to the same alleged violations that the plaintiff was describing in the case.

And you know, I mean I hear that you're saying

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this like lawyers talk all the time in class actions but like what's the case law that says that that's okay and still privileged. I'm not saying it doesn't here. It's not in these letters so I don't even know what is it where this issue has percolated up such that the court weighed in on it. Or I don't know, it's like analogous because it is not -- you say it over and over in your papers and now that there's a common interest but, you know, the generalized common interest is not a common

And you know, as to you both being defendants, you know, your clients being defendants against this party, I would say that's not always, or these parties, it's not always enough.

interest that's sufficient to report a waiver.

And my third kind of question or musing is about well, you know, is it really fair the plaintiffs have pursued, same plaintiff, same lawyers, same theory against two of the larger competitors in the field and then your folks can't talk? It may be that that's a reason, you know, it's good for them, it's good for you but I don't know.

So anyway, even if you have to painstakingly express this to me, I am not clear what it is that you think the common interest is here other than being able to successfully defend this lawsuit.

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MS. O'NEILL: Okay, your Honor. Just so I -- I want to make sure I respond to your question, I want to make sure I understand it.

So is it your conclusion based on the case law or otherwise that a joint legal strategy, formulation of a coordinated legal strategy, two identical lawsuits would not constitute a common interest privilege?

Because our reading of the case law is that very much does and that it's not a generalized sort of we're both like, you know, two companies and we're facing similar issues.

And my reading of the case law is that those are the cases where people tried to say hey, we just though someday we might get sued and we were talking about what might happen. We've actually both been sued at that same time on the same day and we're having conversations about what our lawyers are saying to do. I don't see how that couldn't be a common interest because we're sharing legal strategy about how to proceed in identical lawsuits. If that isn't a common interest, I truly don't know what is. It seems that the doctrine doesn't even exist.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean this is not what the cases that are cited in these letters are, or letter, is about. There's many more examples of either being in the

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same lawsuit, being contractually connected by your relationships, again going back to the infringers and the chain of distribution, or there's some other corporate relationship among the parties.

So I mean is there a particular case that you

think is helpful in the submission that describes the common interest privilege in the way that you're describing it?

MS. O'NEILL: Yes. So we're happy to submit something additional specifically focusing on the question that your Honor has. I think we may need to go beyond the Second Circuit to all federal court precedent because honestly this does not come up very often, this doesn't get challenged very often. Most of the time these sorts of post litigation conversations are understood to be privileged. The parties don't -- I don't usually have plaintiffs trying to get this information knowing that it's about the litigation. They're actually looking for information that's relevant to the claims of the case. What you say about being sued in litigation to me is not relevant at all in the first place. But to the extent --THE COURT: That's a different argument.

MS. O'NEILL: Yeah. No, but I did --

mean you might be right --

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THE COURT: But it's different.

MS. O'NEILL: I mean I did raise that. And we don't understand what the relevance of this is to begin with other than to try to vitiate the privilege and get access to my mental impressions and what I shared with my client that he then shared which is the -- you know, to me the only reason we're doing this is to make sure that this sacrosanct privilege of work product, which is what I share with my client, that then he, and what his lawyers shared with him, and that that strategy does not come out.

I don't see how the plaintiffs have any entitlement to know that anyway, what my strategy was in defending the case. I see no relevance. But to the extent the Court does not agree with us on that, and I'm just trying to prevent further briefing because I don't think that there's any their there. But again, we have to do this because we need to prevent, you know, any sort of waiver of work product or attorney-client privilege.

So relative to that, we're happy to put in more briefing. But I would say that just at a high level this statement -- the reason that they're -- we didn't see cases ever having someone assert this and having it not be upheld.

So from that standpoint, I think it's on the

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plaintiffs to say when people were sued under identical lawsuits and their attorneys talked and said that there was in fact an agreement and the parties spoke, still no privilege existed because those parties didn't have a common interest.

So what they cited are cases that say just saying I want to prevail in litigation isn't enough, but those weren't cases where they were sued in identical lawsuits at the same time by the same parties on the same thing. So it's very different.

But we are happy to put in more things about what constitutes a common interest because we think if anything this does.

of counsel question? Your client shared the information with the belief, based on their communications with their attorney, that they were sharing it confidentially. Even if one were to say it was wrong given that they -- and I'm not saying it is, I'm just trying to understand -- given that that was the understanding (indiscernible) their attorney's insights, then did they waive the privilege in those communications? It's hypothetically. The confidentiality I guess.

MS. O'NEILL: Yeah.

THE COURT: It's a little circular but --

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MS. O'NEILL: Yeah, it's a tough one. Yeah.

It's a tough one to answer. I mean there's clearly no knowing waiver of privilege and I think that's what your Honor is getting at and the law certainly protects innocent waiver, as you noted with clawbacks and that sort of thing. So to the extent you can analogize that certainly there should be no waiver that would prejudice the holder of the privilege which is GiftRocket in this case because there was no knowing waiver. Yeah.

THE COURT: And what about the idea that there should be some balance here given that plaintiff, one could argue the plaintiff structured this case in a way to set it up so that they enjoy the benefits of being able to share information but separated you two into two different lawsuits even though they appear to be -- I don't know if it's a copycat lawsuit when it's done by the same person, you know, the same entity, but a mirror lawsuit. Does that affect the analysis here?

MS. O'NEILL: Yeah. Well, I certainly think your Honor has broad discretion to deny a motion seeking to obtain privileged material or, you know, I should say material over which privilege has been asserted. Your Honor has many grounds on which you can deny such a motion, one which is that in the scenario you're not going to consider the privilege, you're considering

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Proceedings something else which is under a proportionality analysis, under relevance, under the equities, all of the above that in this scenario the plaintiff is seeking to gain access to comments regarding litigation strategy and that's not information that's discoverable. THE COURT: All right. And just to circle back to the point that you wanted to make that you think it's not relevant, you want to just expand on that? Yes, I think our all understanding is hard without making particular reference to certain texts, but still like --I mean anything about the timing of this or how it happened or limited number of parties to the communications that, you know, I should take into account? MS. O'NEILL: Sure. So as I mentioned, we were very -- we did produce many pages of text messages between these two people at these tech startups. These are not major corporations, just to reiterate that. at this company, we produced many pages of text messages between the two and we only redacted a few of them because they specifically referenced something covered by the common interest doctrine meaning comments that pertain to litigation strategies or thoughts shared by their lawyers.

And there's no relevance to the claims in the

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What the case is about is how the plaintiffs were case. purportedly injured by the business model or the website for various things related to that comment that an attorney who is representing the party would make about how to defeat the lawsuit is not relevant to the claims in the case. THE COURT: All right. For plaintiff's side, your thoughts? MR. JANOVE: So your Honor, I think you brought up some interesting questions that would benefit from some supplemental briefing. So I would propose that we could address this with some supplemental briefing. It might also be held by some of the recent deposition testimony and documents that we've discussed with deponents regarding the relationship with Giftly and

deposition testimony and documents that we've discussed with deponents regarding the relationship with Giftly and GiftRocket that not only would touch on the existence or lack thereof of a common interest privilege but touch on to why these communications are relevant for this case.

So it's a long way of me saying I think supplemental briefing is appropriate here.

THE COURT: Do you think it should be sequential or at the same time?

MR. JANOVE: I think it might make sense that we have a joint submission that addresses the three questions you posed today.

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MS. O'NEILL: Your Honor, our preference would be sequential just to make it a little bit simpler in terms of the modifications. We tend to have a lot of back and forth each time someone replies to the other. Actually, sequential briefing would be our strong preference.

THE COURT: All right. We can do it at the same time, not a joint letter, two separate letters. I need a response to what the other side said, we'll let you know. But for now I just want to hear your thoughts about issues that we raised on the plaintiff's side. You know, I don't really want to know about all of the facts that you think are super important, but goes to this relevance point because I think the key issue here is a two-part question. Is it privileged? (Indiscernible) privileged and is there any waiver? Or if there was a waiver, you know, was it not knowing and so it shouldn't be -- at least to the confidentiality, it's not just privileged given the possible scenarios. There were essentially given incorrect advice. Maybe that is what happened and maybe it isn't. But you know, that's the one scenario that one could see here.

All right. So today is the 4th but obviously late in the day here in New York. So what are you -- what would you like to do in terms of submitting a

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   supplemental letter, each of you?
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              MR. JANOVE: Would Friday the 13th work
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    (inaudible)?
              THE COURT: Good luck or bad luck? Does that
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   work for the --
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              MS. O'NEILL: I was going to suggest Tuesday of
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   next week.
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              THE COURT: It's really on the plaintiff's
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   side.
          So you're talking about the 10th and plaintiff,
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   you want the 13th?
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              MR. JANOVE: Correct.
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              THE COURT: All right. Let's do the 13th.
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              MS. O'NEILL: Your Honor, if we're going to do
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    the 13th, can we do the 17th? Our entire team is flying
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    to Los Angeles for training and they'll be out of pocket
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   Wednesday through Friday of next week, so --
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MS. O'NEILL: -- we won't be able to do any
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          That would be great. Thank you.
   work.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MS. O'NEILL: I think that's a Tuesday, or
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    whatever the Tuesday is.
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              THE COURT: Tuesday is the 17th.
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              MS. O'NEILL: Perfect. Thank you so much.
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              THE COURT: Okay. I'm doing this the old
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- 1 | fashioned way, I'm looking at the paper.
- Oh, okay. So from your status letter, I have a
- 3 | couple of follow-up questions.
- MS. O'NEILL: Your Honor, I'm sorry, I forgot
- 5 to ask what would the page limit be for that because I
- 6 think that would be helpful to know.
- 7 THE COURT: What do you all think you need? I
- 8 | mean I'd like you to be focused on the case law.
- 9 MS. O'NEILL: Short and sweet. Short and
- 10 | sweet. Three or four pages max?
- 11 THE COURT: Yes, I think that would work. So
- 12 | let's do -- you're going to do four pages. Okay. All
- 13 | right. So that's for the 17th.
- 14 All right. Looking at your letter of the 2nd
- 15 | which is on the docket at 215, so you have this dispute
- 16 about the Florida subpoena. Do you have any update on
- 17 | what's going on? This is for the South State Bank in the
- 18 | Middle District of Florida.
- 19 MS. KRAMER: So your Honor, this is attorney
- 20 | Katherine Kramer from DTO for the GiftRocket defendants.
- 21 The case is still pending. The plaintiff filed
- 22 | a motion to transfer. We filed a motion to quash. I
- 23 expect that South State Bank is also going to file a
- 24 | motion to quash in opposition to the motion to transfer
- 25 | and then it's just pending with the judge in Florida.

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THE COURT: Okay. All right. And then there's this back and forth about the Philadelphia Pennsylvania deposition. So with regard to the non-party witnesses, do they have some association with the business? they want to do the deposition by Zoom? Or what is it that they're looking for? MR. JANOVE: Your Honor, we had -- the depositions were noticed for all three witnesses on the same day so we were coordinating all three witnesses just to do it at a convenient location for them which was the same location as the WeCare 30(b)(6). So we were scheduling those all three for the same day. We wanted to do it at that same location. If they want to split it up just to let us move on from this, we can have those two witnesses, you know, appear remotely, the nonwitnesses, and then on a separate date Danny Buchnik can come to Philadelphia just to help us move on from it. I've been trying to coordinate it as it was noticed for all three people on the same day. That made it a little more complicated. THE COURT: (Inaudible) --MS. O'NEILL: Your Honor, this is --THE COURT: Hang on one minute. MS. O'NEILL: Sorry, your Honor. THE COURT: I get the fact that the lawyers

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have certain preferences. What is it that the non-party witnesses want to the extent that you know?

MR. JANOVE: The non-party witnesses want to be deposed at a convenient location, right next door to Cafe Ole or via Zoom.

MS. O'NEILL: Thank you, your Honor. So we had proposed doing them all in one day to minimize a burden on the witnesses rather than -- we've had several -- most of our witnesses, four at this point, have been no-parties and they've all gone seven full hours on the record. We were looking to minimize and just do a couple of hours. But we do want to take them in person. And there are various reasons that one of those people we would like to do in person. But those two have been subpoenaed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that we were planning on, you know, moving in that district for compliance since the plaintiff has stated they won't appear for the depositions.

You know, we did propose remote depositions for all witnesses after the plaintiff raised this issue and the plaintiff said no just for these and not for two other witnesses that they could choose, you know, remote or in person which is how it typically works and we were fine with that. But it can't be a different set of rules

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for defense witnesses and a different set of rules for plaintiff's witnesses which is the concern here because that does seem to be the position that plaintiffs are taking.

So yeah, so while this -- it's a bit misleading to say the location as the WeCare deposition. I was not able to travel to take that deposition in person so we took it remotely so the plaintiff was in his own office for that. That was not the location of the deposition. I took it virtually.

So you know, the plaintiffs, we actually had moved the location from the Eastern District of New York down to Philadelphia to be within the geographic area where all of the witnesses reside and said look, we'll just take it for a couple of hours.

If we do end up having to split them up this way, you know, they probably won't be all on the same day. That was all part of our proposed compromise.

But again, our paramount concern is that one of those witnesses, for reasons that I prefer not to get into because I think we should just be able to rely on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and also we're happy to bring this before the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, but there is a particular non-party witness that we have concerns about being in the location that

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   the plaintiffs are insisting the deposition be taken for
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   various reasons. So that's why we'd like to take it on
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   mutual turf and that's why I said, you know, a law office
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   that is not far at all from where the plaintiffs reside.
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   Sorry, the plaintiff. The only one that's before your
           Sorry, the plaintiff. I want to be clear.
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    There's affiliated witnesses and then there's the actual,
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   one of the actual plaintiffs.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So Danny Buchnik is the
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   party witness?
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              MS. O'NEILL: Yes. And that's the one that's
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   before you, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. The problem --
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              MS. O'NEILL: Or will be before you.
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              THE COURT: The problem with all this dancing
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   around is, you know, you want to do this in Philadelphia,
   which is fine, although maybe the judge will kick it
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   here. You run the risk of running out of time for all
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   the procedural maneuvering with your hoped-for witness.
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   So it might make sense for you all to come to an
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   agreement about it.
22
              Okay. So focusing on Danny Buchnik who you're
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    supposed to do this on Friday? Is that right? This is
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   December 6th?
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              MS. O'NEILL: It is set for December 6th, yes.
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And on plaintiff's side, what do THE COURT: you want to do with him? 3

MR. JANOVE: So first --

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THE COURT: I mean we're getting into all of this, you know, extended motion practice in Pennsylvania, then his deposition is just going to go forward. where do you want to do his deposition?

MR. JANOVE: So my proposal was just so we can move on they can take Danny in person as a party witness and the other two witnesses remotely for their convenience. But we -- so we can do Mr. Buchnik in Philadelphia if that's what the defendants prefer. just can't be the same day as the non-party witnesses.

But I did speak to Mr. Buchnik. He has had something that came up with work. December 6th doesn't But he can come to Philadelphia on December 10th in the afternoon at 3 p.m.

THE COURT: All right. It's a set of dominoes here. All right. Now you want to do him on the 10th and you're agreeing to do it in person with the noticed location. Was the purpose of him being an afternoon witness was because you were going to be doing multiple depositions? So going back to defendant's counsel, I guess can you do the 10th? Do you still envision him as being an afternoon witness? What's the situation?

32 Proceedings 1 MS. O'NEILL: No, unfortunately for the reasons 2 I mentioned earlier, we're --3 THE COURT: Training? 4 MS. O'NEILL: Our lawyers, yeah. They're 5 flying to the west coast on the 10th. So that's why we 6 had all of these depositions going through the 9th 7 instead. Perhaps the ninth would work, but the 10th won't. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. Do you know what his 10 story is? MR. JANOVE: I can see if the 9th works but --11 12 I'll check with him if the 9th works. But I mean I was 13 hoping that I could offer the 3 p.m. in Philadelphia, you 14 know, meet me halfway and just do the non-party witnesses remotely on a different date. 15 16 MS. O'NEILL: We can do the 9th and the second 17 part, we can do the 9th and we would start in the morning 18 because we're not going to stack all three in the same 19 day then and we can just have a normal deposition time. 20 MR. JANOVE: All right. Well, not sure if he's 21 available in the morning. 22 THE COURT: All right. Why don't you check 23 with him? All right. What we're leaving off here is 24 with regards to this witness, the first choice for your

mutual availability is sometime again in the hierarchy of

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1 the morning better than the afternoon on the 9th. And if 2 he's not available that day, then get other dates for the 3 week of the 16th. I guess for the rest of the month. 4 And then you all should coordinate when you can do it. 5 And travel is not -- I get the training. You know, people are going to be doing other things. But their 6 7 availability to travel is not enough of a reason not to 8 go ahead with the deposition. Somebody will have to do 9 it. I hope you can come to an agreement as to doing 10 this. You know again, Zoom being -- you know, if there's 11 not a date for doing it in person then do it remotely. 12 But any which way, you need to do it by the end of the 13 year. 14 MS. O'NEILL: Thank you, your Honor. We do 15 have --16 THE COURT: All right. And that --MS. O'NEILL: Your Honor, we do --17 18 THE COURT: Go ahead. 19 MS. O'NEILL: I was just going to say we do 20 have lots of other days that we could do. I mean we 21 picked the 6th because that's the day they gave us. And 22 I would just reiterate that if our witnesses, meaning the 23 defense witnesses, must appear in person, I would ask the 24 Court to make clear that it cannot be the case that 25 plaintiffs insist on remote depositions but refuse to

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   take them of our witnesses.
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              THE COURT: All right. I'm not --
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              MS. O'NEILL: It's just out of the spirit of
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   fairness. It's just not fair, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: It's not, it's not. That's not how
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   this is going to work. You know, the parties and the
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   non-parties are different. There are different
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   considerations for different witnesses. And you know,
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   you basically have about two months to wrap up this case.
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   So whatever it takes to move it forward is what you need
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    to do. This is why I was --
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                                 Thank you.
              MS. O'NEILL: No.
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              THE COURT: I'm not going to address the non-
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   party witnesses. It would --
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              MS. O'NEILL: Oh, I'm not asking you to, your
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           I'm sorry if that's what you thought I was
    saying. What I was saying is that plaintiff's counsel
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   just said if we had --
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              THE COURT: I got it, I got it.
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              MS. O'NEILL: This is a plaintiff's witness.
   This is a party witness. That's all we're talking about,
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22
   your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          I heard you. I'm telling you I'm
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   not adopting the blanket rule that you're saying. And
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   I'm also telling you all that you really need to work out
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the dates for these witnesses. And if you get into motion practice over this in Pennsylvania, then maybe it'll move quickly. Obviously Florida is taking a while. And it's not going to be a reason to extend the discovery schedule. So you know, work it out. One thing I do want to raise, there is a footnote going to, what is it, the sale of the cafe? Do I have this right? And the suggestion that there's a conflict between the parties, a live issue, what's the situation? It's footnote 1. That's a letter --MS. O'NEILL: Yes. THE COURT: -- at 215, so it's on page 3. MS. O'NEILL: Yes, your Honor, that's our footnote for GiftRocket. Yeah, so this will lead to the issue regarding Anna, the non-party witness. But this is a person who purchased the -- WeCare is one of the plaintiffs. They own Cafe Ole. They're one of the parties that's got claims here against GiftRocket. Cafe Ole was purchased by Anna during -- very recently, a few months ago. And there is a dispute about whether the sale agreement would have included the claims present in this litigation. And we're not really sure what to do because it's a fairly novel issue to have a conflict related to a third party so but just feel very uncomfortable taking

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the deposition of someone about the transaction where they're being defended by the lawyer who represents the person on the other side when the transaction is actually what's at issue and what's covered.

So raising that for the Court but not really sure what to do about it because we raised it with plaintiff's counsel. We don't think it's a potential conflict. We think it's a very clear conflict of interest but we're not really sure what to do about it. That's why it's in the footnote.

THE COURT: Let's start with what the parties, or the party, non-party thinks about this. I mean is there any view that the plaintiff's counsel is aware of that (indiscernible) documents is -- or the parties are unclear, the parties to the sale transaction are unclear as to what they bought and sold?

MR. JANOVE: No, your Honor. As (indiscernible) testified as a 30(b)(1) and 30(b)(6) witness, he did not sell his claims in this lawsuit to Anna. Anna did not purchase the claims in this lawsuit. As you know, I think becoming a named plaintiff in any sort of class action is not something that people take lightly. Also, she's just a barrister at the cafe who saved some money with her sister to buy it. She wasn't getting involved in litigation. So there is no conflict.

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She can just testify to the same if we agree on the location for that testimony to occur. May I also note that --

THE COURT: Just to back up to what you see the lawsuit as being for you. Is there an end period for the class at this point or no?

MR. JANOVE: Well, so there's certainly a body of case law that's developed about what happens when a class representative individual claim for injunctive relief becomes moot and whether --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JANOVE: -- they still have standing to seek classwide injunctive relief. The law has become generally clear that the standing to seek classwide relief, injunctive relief, is measured to the time of filing the complaint.

So maybe that WeCare, since it sold its cafe, no longer has an individual claim for injunctive relief, it still has standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief on behalf of the class.

THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to try to resolve this one now but I guess like the other side of that question, okay, it doesn't have -- assume for the sake of this discussion that plaintiff's claims were going to be successful. From the date of sale forward,

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wouldn't the cafe, as owned by the purchaser, be the 1 2 beneficiary of whatever relief there would be for the 3 period of time of the ownership? So in your, you know, 4 in your wildest dreams, right, I know you're like fine 5 tuning this, but you know, you think there would be some 6 damages that could flow from this and then there could be 7 injunctive -- this meaning the lawsuit -- and then there could be injunctive relief and that would be split I 8 9 suppose between the different periods of ownership, 10 right? 11 So while they didn't, I think what you're 12 saying, they didn't sell the claims up through the date 13 of sale, they also didn't retain them as they might, I 14 mean I'm not agreeing with any of this, but as they 15 might be still accruing from the date of sale, you know, 16 to the present and into the future depending on how long 17 this all takes. Right? 18 I mean there's no retaining some interest. I 19 read the sale. I mean they didn't retain any interest in 20 future damages or future claims, right? 21 MR. JANOVE: Do you mean WeCare having 22 additional claims that might accrue post April 20 --23 THE COURT: Yes. '24, yes. 24 MR. JANOVE: Yeah, 2024. Yeah. 25 WeCare had been de-listed from GiftRocket's website

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shortly after this lawsuit was filed.

THE COURT: Okay. So you think there may not actually be any problem, any ongoing problem. Okay.

All right. Look, in terms of this deposition, the fact that the defendants envision that there's a conflict with the plaintiff and the other parties don't believe there's a conflict and they have a mutual understanding of the significance of their agreement, then there is not a conflict at this point. If it becomes a life issue that the interpretation of the agreement should be different from what the parties think, then maybe there would be a problem. But I don't see this as an issue to slow down the work or compromise the representation of either of these folks. Okay.

MS. O'NEILL: Your Honor? Your Honor, if I can just take 20 seconds on that which is we're not questioning in any way what the plaintiff's interpretation of the agreement was or what Anna, the new purchaser. Our only point is that if there's a sale agreement and the question for the lawyer is does this entitle me to recovery in a lawsuit, the person who has to answer that is your lawyer who's interpreting the legal impact of that contract. And if the lawyer represents both sides, then they cannot give advice that would not be subject to a conflict of interest because if

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they said here, you get a claim under it or you don't get a claim under it because as you said you saw the bill and it says all assets tangible and intangible including goodwill which the plaintiff in the complaint say they're seeking.

So for all of those -- those are the reasons we raise it. I just wanted to make clear we felt like we had to raise it and as officers of the court, it's uncomfortable to take a deposition of someone under those circumstances. But we don't need to discuss it further but we just wanted that on the record.

THE COURT: All right. But to take the plaintiff's point, obviously your client is taking the position there are no valid claims here but given the delisting, is there any possibility that there are accruing claims for the cafe?

MS. O'NEILL: The fact -- I agree that the cafe has never had standing from the very beginning because as the plaintiff, WeCare testified they don't believe anyone ever saw them, there's no basis to think saw them on the website. So agreed as to all of that. There were no damages at any point in time. But the plaintiff is in fact seeking damages.

So what if in the hypothetical world that there was a settlement, for example, related to Cafe Ole's

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supposed damage? Who would those funds go to? Would it be the prior owner or the person who purchased all the assets in Cafe Ole? I certainly know what my legal opinion would be. So that's where this came up.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's just circle back to the question that I asked plaintiff's counsel which is to his knowledge, and having listened to the issue with the two of them, do they have any disagreements as to their understanding of the sale of the assets and what that entails? That would encompass any benefit from a lawsuit which based on the facts here seems to be time bound anyway, but this is an issue in many a case but according to plaintiff's counsel is representing that these two parties do not have a disagreement. They do not have a live conflict. If something changes in their view, then maybe they would but they don't have it now.

All right. Let's talk about the schedule. We have the letter from Sunrise who I guess is the most sympathetic in terms of the timeline here related to this excitement.

I think it seems to me there's more work to be done than necessarily what's described in this letter but given the work that you have to do, so we just added the briefing. You have the agreed upon production of the results of the search and some other dates from earlier

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1 today. You have identifying a 30(b)(6) deponent for
2 deposition. This will happen in January. That's by the
3 23rd of December.

Producing documents about plaintiff's financial and business structure, that's the same date.

Producing documents about Tremendous from defendant, that's also by the 23rd.

And then letting me know that you have firmed up your 30(b)(6) depositions by January 3rd.

And then the damages supplement is I think -- really it should require some significant thinking on the plaintiff's part. That's also by January 3rd.

So you know, the Florida matter up in the air. If you turn the Pennsylvania issue into something, that's also up in the air. And to the extent you're doing any other depositions which I'll ask you about in a second, I think you have an awful lot of work to do in the next part of the year.

So taking into account the Sunrise concern plus the work that you all need to be doing, I think extending this to mid-February is the outside of reasonableness given the age of the case. So I'm going to say all of this discovery needs to wrap up by Valentines Day.

Okay. Do you anticipate any other disputes about depositions? I mean have you been -- outside of

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the 30(b)(6), the fact witnesses.

MR. JANOVE: Speaking for plaintiffs, we don't anticipate -- we have 30(b)(6)'s for the GiftRocket defendants, a 30(b)(6) for Sunrise, and a couple of other fact witnesses that should all be done in January.

THE COURT: All right. How about for --

MR. RASHID: Your Honor, this is --

THE COURT: Sorry. Go ahead.

MR. RASHID: I apologize. I didn't mean to speak over you. This is Faris Rashid for Sunrise, and we also do not anticipate any disputes related to depositions.

THE COURT: Defendant?

MS. KRAMER: Your Honor, this is Katherine
Kramer of DTO for the GiftRocket defendants. I had a
question about the Court's order on the 30(b)(6) topic
and we appreciate it, it seemed like the Court took a
very close look at everything. I wanted clarification of
whether the limitation applies to all three of the
corporate defendants or if the Court had in mind some
distinctions between the GiftRocket LLC and then, for
example, the Tremendous Parent, which is really just a
holding company that's been in existence for a year and a
half. If the limitations of topic were intended to be
consistent across the board between those three or if the

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Court was thinking perhaps we would just have fewer than three 30(b)(6) depositions?

put that back to you. I mean I have no idea what it's going to take in terms of the number of witnesses or who the witnesses are. Right? I mean if you talk about broad categories, you have the technology folks, the finance people, the strategy people, the history of these transactions, and maybe -- you know, I don't know where the restructuring falls in all that.

So I don't know if I'm answering your question.

What I don't know is for all three companies, you know,
taking your point that the parent is now the relatively
recent, in this current structure is relatively recent
invention, and at least from the descriptions you
provided, that's not where the tech people are housed,
right? The ones who are figuring out how to use
(indiscernible). Whether it's still happening or not,
that's a different question. But for example, there's an
AI question, there's a Yelp question, there was a web
design question. I don't know if it's the same person
for these different entities or not.

So there's no one who knows. The information, is the information the same across the entities? I don't know that all of the questions are relevant to all the

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entities given what you have described in your various papers of what it is that they do.

Maybe for me to understand your question you can give me an example of what you're concerned about in terms of across the entities.

MS. KRAMER: Sure. I think the concern is the plaintiffs served three identical sets of topics on three different entities and it doesn't really make sense to me that all three entities would then provide witnesses to testify on the same things. But it may be that, you know, we can look everything over and we have a meet and confer that's now been scheduled with the plaintiffs for next week. So maybe we can take the order, the Court's guidance into account and talk this over with the plaintiffs.

We've also now finished the fact witness depositions for essentially everybody at the company that has knowledge. So there's been a good opportunity for the plaintiffs to learn the facts. So we'll I think perhaps just have some conversations with them. If the Court doesn't have further guidance on this issue, it may be that we just need to talk amongst the parties and figure out a reasonable approach that doesn't overburden the witnesses and you know, what we're trying to avoid is just duplicative preparation and discovery because that

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1 seems --

THE COURT: Okay. So maybe --

MS. KRAMER: That doesn't make sense to me.

THE COURT: Let me tell you as far as I went, and if this means that, you know, even if you don't work it out you have another question -- what I looked at were the demands that were made and thought about it in connection with the overall lawsuit and whether it was a reasonable balance of what the issues are that are important and central to the case. And then there are others that are more peripheral, may be relevant, but also seemed burdensome. And so, you know, they were peripheral and burdensome. You know, they fell on the no, you don't have to do this. But the objections were pretty much blanket objections to various facets of these questions.

And so what I did not try to parse, and if it turns out that this is relevant, is -- I'm going to say two things. I did not try to parse if the place where a particular topic is most appropriately or even relevantly addressed and it's not addressed in another entity, it wasn't addressing that the other entity should come up with a witness.

So let me just give you an example. I'll go back to what I was trying to use as a description or give

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a description of. But take the web design. That would seem like something for this case that is primarily something relevant to GiftRocket. Maybe Tremendous, the parent company, the holding company, has some information about that but not necessarily. And Tremendous is doing the monetary transfers, you know, the sort of separated entity. You know, that seems like it's a really different set of questions how they are doing their website and is it relevant.

Now, maybe you're using the same tech company, tech people, tech supervisors and somebody could be providing information across the cases, you know, how the tech department is run. Maybe because these companies started together, maybe there is a legacy computer system that is relevant to understanding how, just by way of example, you know, the Yelp, culling of the Yelp information was happening. But I'm not trying to create a false basis for exploring information that is not relevant, is not housed in the particular company and really is not relevant to this.

And the reason I say all of that is because it is possible, right, in the 30(b)(6) land to have somebody be the representative of the company, learn the information, and then testify and that would satisfy the 30(b)(6), you know, requirement. If you decide that's

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how you want to proceed, that's one thing, but I am not suggesting that that be imposed so you have three duplicate depositions that really the information is only relevant to one company (indiscernible) and one company and there's a witness that is the person who really knows

what that is.

So I think, you know, the motion practice didn't try to parse out the different companies, but if that's something that you all can't come to an agreement about, then you should raise that. Not trying to create essentially made up witnesses here. It just wasn't part of what you -- this is basically a bifurcation. Yes, relevant and not so burdensome that it shouldn't be produced or not relevant or too burdensome, doesn't need to be produced.

So you know, that's as far as this went. If there's another level of analysis that you think would be appropriate and needs to be factored in, then I think, you know, to the extent you can't come to an agreement about the witnesses you should raise that hopefully quickly which is part of the point of having the witnesses identified and the schedule set. And you know who's being produced for what reason and for what understanding.

And you know, I will just pick up on one thing

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you said which was referenced by way of a case that Judge Pollak had. Since there's already been deposition testimony that can be adopted by mutual agreement and obviates the need for a particular examination, that could help you really move through this. You have had high level people already deposed so you may have the best information that's available.

So the short answer to your question is I didn't think that through and didn't see it in the papers. If I missed it, you can raise it. If you missed it or at least didn't anticipate it and you want to raise it, that's fine. This is definitely not an exercise in creating more work.

MS. KRAMER: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: Any thoughts?

MS. KRAMER: No, I appreciate that very much and I think that the Court certainly took on analyzing these issues beyond what the parties had asked for at this point in time but I think what we were anticipating. So it's very helpful to have that guidance.

It sounds to me like what your Honor had in mind was that you were trying to narrow it down to relevant topics with the idea that then the parties would try to divvy those topics up among the most relevant entities. So it's not that those topics would then be

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topics for each of the three entities but essentially what your Honor is trying to do is narrow it down and say hey, these are the relevant issues, now go take these and figure out should it be GiftRocket, should it be Tremendous, should it be Tremendous Parent. Is that what your Honor had in mind?

THE COURT: Yes, except to the extent that information that's housed, for example, in GiftRocket, you know, might be, you know, you need to work out whether that was binding for Tremendous, something like that. But yes, I want you to do it efficiently. And again, that's the point of trying to get the schedule set up and clarified sooner rather than later.

You know, I think you all generally agree on what's relevant except for the big picture, not big picture, but big points that whether the restructuring was meant to divert assets or hide out or something. And you know, plaintiffs are suggesting they should be allowed to explore it. I gave you some leeway in terms of the documents, you know, but not in terms of depositions. You know, if the lay of the land changes and that analysis should change, you could raise that issue. But otherwise I think, you know, you're all exploring the same topics really, at least in terms of whether there is or isn't liability here.

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All right. So a couple of things to look back at the rest of the schedule for a second.

So back in the September order I believe it is -- I think this is the most -- hold on a second, let me just --

MR. JANOVE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: All right. Go back -- but I want to say in the September order I had a requirement that by the 18th you were going to put in a letter with regard to class certification, motion practice, and expert discovery. That was tied to some other deadlines. So wondering what you think. Should that be pushed out or are you in a position knowing you're going to wrap up in mid-February? And also, I believe Judge Kovner had an order for you to give her some dates.

MS. KRAMER: Your Honor, I think with the case schedule one of the things that we haven't gotten any sort of indication from the plaintiffs on is whether or not they intend to have any experts. And I know that's a question that we've raised in our papers. That would go into figuring out what the remainder of the case schedule might be. I don't know if the plaintiffs have anything to say about that.

THE COURT: What is going on? You need to show your cards. What's the deal? What is your thought about

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whether you're using experts? I mean well, I can imagine several topics. I don't know if you're going to do it or not but what's the story?

4 MS. KRAMER: Is that a question to the 5 plaintiff?

THE COURT: Yes. I'm sitting here with baited breath. Experts or no experts?

MR. JANOVE: Your Honor, I think on the expert decision it's probably unlikely but we do want to see the documents that you just ordered production of today, the full financial scope and full financial production that we haven't yet gotten before we make a final decision on that.

MS. KRAMER: Your Honor, I just don't see how this remaining handful of nonessential documents is going to make or break the plaintiff's decision on whether or not they're going to have experts because we need to be able to figure out what the plaintiff's case is. And honestly, that's why we're asking for clarification on what's the damages theory. How do you have standing? How do you have damages? What's the harm if you have businesses that nobody ever saw and nothing ever happened with them? You know, what's the case? We've been litigating this for a long time.

Right. All right. I mean okay, if

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it's not clear to the plaintiffs, I mean I think there's merit to the defendant's request that you clarify the demands. Obviously, that's why I'm having you do the Rule 26 supplementation. But then it becomes I think depending on what area you're pursuing, you know, some case law would require experts especially if you're doing a market analysis which I don't know if you are or you're

not. Or you're doing a sampling analysis.

So yes, I guess I'm really open to what it is that the defendants are saying in terms of conceptualizing this case. You know, whether you decide the information is useful enough to be fruitful, you know, that's a different question than conceptually what kind of experts are you thinking about? What are they going to testify about? You know, all the sort of initial disclosure that experts would provide at least in part. I'm not even talking about the level of, you know, here's the list of their former testimony or their articles. I'm talking about what areas are you going to use experts in or not because obviously there is a question that defendants keep asking which I think is two parts, right? It's like are you pursuing disgorgement? Are you pursuing a theory of individual harm to reputations? You know, all of this is linked. I think this has been obvious for a while that we're getting

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super close to you having to commit to what is the class certification theory, you know, what are you looking for, and also to the judge deciding the standing issue which is overlapping, you know, whether ultimately linked or not. It could be linked or it could just overlap but, you know, have two separate analogies but at least touching on some of the same concerns, right? And I'm stating the super obvious, right? But even over the course of this litigation the Supreme Court has become, and the circuit, has become more focused on what is an actual damage or what kind of harm is compensable especially in statutory claims which is part of your case here.

All right. I think this really has to get put to a resolution. So I think the way we had it, the way I put it in was that by January 3rd you're going to supplement the initial disclosures so that defendants have some idea of the damages theory that you're pursuing. So I think that goes hand in hand with the experts.

So I think really the way to do this would be -- and this case, question after question piles up if we don't know if you're doing the experts, right?

Because if there's no experts and you're not using experts particularly in the class cert motion, you could

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move ahead with that. Maybe you're even moving ahead with summary judgment. You know, I'm not sure if you'd like to talk about that with Judge Kovner. And then, you know, if you're using the experts, then it's a real question do you need them for the class certification motion or not? Are they damages experts and you could be making your class cert motion while the expert discovery is happening? You know, there's several permutations all of which we are all sitting here with baited breath. What's the deal? MR. JANOVE: So your Honor, if I could just illustrate why the production of the full set of financials might help inform this decision for one discrete theory of relief is that under the Lanham Act we're going to seek disgorgement of defendant's profits. Right? And by the statutory text, us as plaintiffs have the burden of showing defendant's profit from the unlawful activity. And that could be just as straightforward as, you know, pointing to simple financial statements, simple financial documents, data regarding gift card redemptions on GiftRocket.com or on the Tremendous business line. Or depending on the cost analysis or how convoluted these financial documents may

or may not be, it is possible that we might need some

additional expert help in carrying that burden to show

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profit.

So without having seen those documents yet, I can't for sure a whether or not an expert is going to be required for us to carry our burden on the Lanham Act to prove defendant's profits. But I think --

THE COURT: All right. I'm not really sure I follow. I don't know. I'm not sure if that's persuasive or not.

But look, the document production that you're concerned about is coming basically on the same schedule that your damages analysis needs to be updated and expanded. So I think that to the extent you want to put off committing to whether you're going to have experts -- look at the calendar here.

Just before I pick the dates, please remind me or point me on this docket where the most recent order from Judge Kovner was because I think you have to give her an update as well. Is that right? She wanted a proposed schedule for something. Am I imagining this? I thought you had a conference with her, that there was an order.

MR. JANOVE: Correct. We had a conference where she -- after the conference she overruled the discovery objection and at the conference she said she will be ruling on the other outstanding, the motion to

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scheduled for 12/13.

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dismiss which she did --2 THE COURT: All right. Okay. This is the 3 11/13 order. Right? So the Court will adjudicate 4 standing with respect to the second amended complaint 5 based on the existing filing and the existing R&R because 6 discovery will close, will soon close. Defendants do not 7 intend to file further a motion to dismiss, instead 8 anticipate filing a motion for summary judgment before 9 class certification. The parties will propose a case 10 schedule and joint letter to Judge Scanlon within five 11 days of the close of discovery which is currently

THE COURT: Okay. So is this still the case that the summary judgment motion practice is going to happen before -- you know, we're running through the various permutations and obviously the standing issue is over all of this. But for defendants, are you still pursuing that schedule?

MS. KRAMER: Your Honor, the docket in this case is obviously a bit lengthy.

THE COURT: The 11/13/24 order from Judge Kovner says that she'll deal with the standing issue based on the current record and that you are going to, defendants, were going to file summary judgment motions before class certification. Is that still the working

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1 plan?

MS. KRAMER: Yes, I believe so.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So let's go back to plaintiff. I was going to ask you focusing on the question of expert discovery in connection with damages and class cert to the extent you're envisioning particular experts, are they necessary for the summary judgment motion? What I'm trying to get at is what's the schedule here. Right? You're finishing --

MR. JANOVE: Yeah. No, so --

THE COURT: -- in February, finishing fact discovery in February. Are you then moving on to the summary judgment motion practice because any expert discovery is about damages? Like what --

MR. JANOVE: So we envision after the close of discovery moving for class cert. We can work on the timing when defendants bring their summary judgment motion. I think the summary judgment motions are related to individual liabilities with certain defendants and to the standing of just two of the plaintiffs. But that's not an issue. The summary judgment won't affect the class cert motion. So you know, our proposal would be --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, but what was the conversation with Judge Kovner? I mean I don't have the transcript but what it says is that the defendants

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instead anticipate filing motions for summary judgment before class certification. And I'm not following how it wouldn't affect class certification because based on your description of the motion -- okay.

All right. The baseline is class certification happens first and there's obviously all of the strategic analysis that everybody can go through, whether you know, the summary judgment is going to be dispositive for the class or if it's better to have class certification and then the summary judgment because then the class is bound.

Okay. Putting aside those considerations, at least what you just said is the defendants are challenging two of the -- you think they're going to just challenge two of the three class reps. So then you'd be making a class cert soon just for the sake of this. If they're successful, then you are moving with only one class rep which, you know, you can do but that's --

Let's switch the focus to defendant for a second. What is it that you are looking for and does anybody recall exactly what the conversation was with the district judge? That would be helpful.

MR. JANOVE: Yes, your Honor. This is
Katherine Kramer. The conversation with the district
judge was about how to make this efficient because we

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were still at the point of potentially filing motions to dismiss for some of the parties. And we said that doesn't really make sense to do that because then we would just be challenging the pleadings and at this point we basically know all the facts because we're pretty close to the end of discovery. So we agreed that instead of filing a motion to dismiss we would be able to do a partial summary judgment motion --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KRAMER: -- and we'd be able to do that without the pre-motion conference process and essentially cover that in the conference that we had with her. So that's what we had in mind.

And essentially some of the arguments that we would have otherwise made about, you know, standing and issues like that that have been raised in the motions to dismiss that have been filed already on behalf of some of the defendants, I expect that we would raise those. I think it's entirely possible that we'll have summary judgment motions across the board, but we'll see. The idea was that we would be able to do partial summary judgment motions and we'll figure that out without being bound to a limited number of that.

But I think that the idea was that we would then file the summary judgment motion before class

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certification because I think that it would, the ruling on the summary judgment would have a huge impact. You know, potentially the whole case would be gone if the summary judgment across the board is granted and then there is no class to certify because there's no case.

THE COURT: Okay. Just so I'm clear, is the summary judgment motion practice that you discussed with Judge Kovner, is that only the partial summary judgment which is essentially a proxy for the motion to dismiss? All you're talking also about what I'll call the global summary judgment motion?

MS. KRAMER: Well, we wanted to just leave our options open for that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KRAMER: So it's not limited to partial summary judgment, but partial summary judgment is possible.

THE COURT: Right. On the defendant's side, I guess -- you can't really answer the question because it goes back to the plaintiff. You need to know what your story is with regard to experts and are those experts relevant to -- would they know what they're testifying about or proposed to testify about? Then defendants could make a decision about partial summary judgment, complete summary judgment, when it should happen, and

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everybody would understand the theory of the class certification with much greater clarity.

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So all right, I think to move this forward we have the dates for the production I think. Plaintiffs, you need to commit. Are you having experts and if so, what are they testifying about? So you're going to have that information by January 3rd. You can look through I think by January 24th the plaintiff -- and I'm assuming just the way this case has gone that if plaintiffs are having the initial moving experts, if you're having experts at all, that you need to do at least the initial disclosure which is who the experts are and what it is they're going to testify about. And then I think we could revert to something closer to the schedule that we had before which is you all can propose the expert schedule and then I think you also need to know the expert discovery schedule and then the motion practice schedule.

And I think on the defendant's side, one question here is are you making an early -- basically filling out what you were saying to the district judge, and early, early-ish partial summary judgment motion once the fact discovery is done? Are you waiting for expert discovery? This is becoming a complete bottleneck here not knowing what's happening and trying to figure out

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1 where to go.

All right. You have the interim dates. You have February 14th is really the absolute close of fact discovery. So unless something completely unexpected happens, you should expect that that's the close of fact discovery.

And then by January 24th, the plaintiffs will receive from -- I'm sorry. Plaintiffs will give the information that I just said about the experts and the topic and what's the names of the experts. And I'm just trying to sync this up with what Judge Kovner was asking for.

And then I think once we know that, let's say by February 7th there's a joint letter with the schedule, expert discovery, dispositive motion practice, class cert motion practice, and that should probably go to both judges.

And then since I don't know everything that you covered, I don't know what was exempted from a pre-motion conference letter or what would need a letter, so you're going to have to fill in those details.

All right. I think that's a working schedule here. I have the information that you gave me. We'll enter an order on the issues that are in the status letter. If you have issues that come up along the way,

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Proceedings preferably you'll let me know by a joint letter, but you 1 2 know, let me know as quickly as you can so that we can deal with it so it can be resolved within the discovery 3 4 time period. 5 All right. I'm going to raise one other thing before I let you go. Any reigniting of settlement 6 7 discussions? You know, we kept getting tempting suggestions which I am absolutely not picking up to know 8 9 what happened with Giftly and how you all could get there. Any thoughts now that you've done the discovery 10 11 or will be moving towards finishing it that you want to 12 have more settlement discussions? You think mediation 13 would be helpful? If yes, any interest in private 14 mediation or court mediation? As always, there's deafening silence. So let's start with --15 16 MR. JANOVE: Uh --17 THE COURT: -- defendants on this one. I heard 18 plaintiff's counsel. Go ahead. Plaintiff's counsel, 19 your thoughts about that? 20 MR. JANOVE: Oh, yeah. I mean we made a demand 21 a few weeks ago and haven't heard back. So we're 22 assuming that settlement discussions aren't going to make 23 any progress, aren't making progress at this moment. 24 MS. O'NEILL: Hi, your Honor. This is Megan 25 O'Neill for the GiftRocket defendants. You know, I think

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that the door is always open. I think this isn't probably the best time in terms of we're teeing up a lot of motion practice at this stage of the case. But like I said, the door is always open so it's not closed. I think though that the experience with the cancelled mediation has soured that quite a bit. So meaning I would absolutely want to go to mediation but for what had happened last time.

So I'm not sure that our clients are -- they certainly have not closed the door to settlement but I don't think there's a reason to order mediation at this point given the history.

this is obviously a two to tango, but to the point that was made earlier, you know why summary judgment instead of a motion to dismiss because you already know everything, or almost everything there is to know. So it seems like everybody would be in a stronger position to evaluate the possibility of your definition of success, succeeding, or you know, loss and what the exposure is and whether there's an interest in protecting against that early in the day. So whatever metaphor you want to use for talking about how to come to a resolution short of dispositive motion practice and trial.

Like I'm sure this has been an expensive case.

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The experts are probably not going to make the amount of money (indiscernible) but you are moving to the motion practice in the next couple of months and you have the information you need. So it might make sense to have the conversation. It's up to you all what you want to do. MS. O'NEILL: All very good points, your Honor. I think once we have the plaintiff's theory of the case articulated a little more clearly, that might be a good time to think about doing that again. I think we're still lacking some information. So once we have that, you know, maybe that'll be a better time. So like I said, the door is not in any way closed. You know, we just are not in the same ballpark at the present moment. THE COURT: Okay. On that point, just to go back to plaintiff, you know, you had in your letters expressed reluctance about committing to a damages theory and suggesting you need more information, whatever. Obviously, you haven't made a decision in that regard. But you could satisfy the order or you could be even more complete and really showing your hand on the analysis maybe short of the need for the experts so that you could get this conversation going because I think the fundamental point on the defendant's side is what is their realistic exposure? Obviously they say none but to

the extent you have helpful analysis, it would be a good

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    idea to start sharing it because it is going to come out
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    anyway. Okay.
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              MR. JANOVE: Your Honor, we didn't include that
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   type of analysis in the demand we made a few weeks ago
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    that we're not hearing back from, but your point is well
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    taken and we can certainly make it more clear to the
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    GiftRocket defendants.
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              THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's all we
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   have here.
                So thanks very much and have a good week.
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    Take care. Bye.
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              MS. O'NEILL: Thank you, your Honor.
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              MS. KRAMER: Thank you so much.
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              MR. JANOVE: Thank you, your Honor.
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                          (Matter concluded)
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Ι

I, MARY GRECO, hereby certify that the foregoing transcript of the said proceedings is a true and accurate transcript from the electronic soundrecording of the proceedings reduced to typewriting in the above-entitled matter.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested directly or indirectly in this action.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 6th day of December, 2024.

Transcriptions Plus II, Inc.

Mary Greco